The anti-apartheid struggle in Denmark: a response
By Morten Nielsen
Trough many years I have been part of the
anti-apartheid movement and its successor organisation, even if I am coming from
another perspective than Steen Christensen – namely the activist and
non-parliamentarian side of the Danish anti-apartheid struggle. From the side
of the anti-apartheid struggle where we attempted, and succeeded, to create a
pressure on the Danish parliamentarian system in order for the official Denmark
to impose economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa. For a number of
years my work was to lobby the political parties of the Danish Parliament,
Folketinget, including the Danish Social Democratic Party of which Steen
Christensen has been a leading member.
There are a number of questions in Steen
Christensen's article to which an activist outside the corridors of power
cannot know all the answers. I recognise that Denmark and other Nordic
countries in many ways, were in the forefront in the struggle against apartheid,
but why did it take so long time, so many years, before the international
community, and Denmark, started to do something stronger than just condemning
apartheid in words?
In 1959 the ANC president at that time
Chief Albert Lutuli came with a clear resolution, a demand for boycott on South
African goods, when he addressed the British workers in connection with the
South African Union 50 years’ anniversary. From this point in time, it was the
main demand of the ANC to isolate South Africa politically, economically and
culturally.
When in 1963, the Danish minister of
foreign affairs Per Hækkerup (from the Social Democratic Party) at the UN
Annual Assembly proclaimed that sanctions on South Africa would only be
implemented by Denmark if the UN Security Council approved of it. He was of
course aware that this would never happen as long as the USA and Great Britain
could veto such a decision in the UN Security Council (which they actually did
a number of times). In my eyes, this indicates that our Minister of Foreign
Affairs Per Hækkerup's speech at the UN Annual Assembly cannot be viewed as a
breakthrough for the recognition of the struggle against apartheid. I think, it
was something else. The hidden agenda was to put sanctions aside and execute
only verbal protest against apartheid, by placing the whole responsibility of
sanctions on the shoulders of the UN Security Council. His speech was defined
to a large extend by the Danish relation to NATO and to the United States.
It was - apparently - only in the
mid-1980'es that the Social Democrats realised that the UN Security Council
would not take any further actions, beside weapon sanctions which were already
introduced in 1978. Only then the sympathy towards economic sanctions gradually
evolved in the party. Files archived at ABA, The Labour Movement Library and
Archive in Copenhagen, shows that the board of LO, The National Labour
Federation in Denmark, discussed the matter of sanctions both in the 1970’s and
beginning 80's. But this was strictly internally. Externally LO kept quiet on
their opinions in this matter. Perhaps this was due to disagreements. On this
background, it seems to me that the speech of Hækkerup in the UN contributed to
the delay and postponement of a genuine debate on the use of sanctions in
Danish foreign policy. Furthermore, it is worth noting that it was not until
the Social Democratic Party was thrown out in opposition to the conservative-liberal
government from 1983 to 1994 that it was possible to move the party to push for
sanctions against apartheid South Africa.
However, in this period the alternative non-government
majority in the parliament used the matters of both South Africa and security
policies to tease the conservative-liberal government. These positions were
meant for internal Danish affairs and it is difficult for me to see this tactic
as a genuine attempt from the Social Democratic-Radical Party opposition to
make Denmark shift to another foreign policy approach on South Africa.
In my view this shows that by giving his
speech in the UN, our Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Hækkerup stopped and
closed the debate on sanctions, and it took until the beginning of the
1980’s before the debate started again.
Sanctions against South Africa were a
political issue in Denmark from the beginning of the 1960s. A quick look on Danish
Gallup opinion pole institute shows that from 1961 to 1964 one of the main
questions to the Danes, asked in the big annual questionnaires, was, "how
do you relate to state sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa?”
However, after 1964, it vanished and only from the beginning of the 1980s, this
question again became part of Gallup's questionnaires to the Danes.
Ten problems are put by Gallup to a
selection of the Danes every year as main political questions. This means that
if Gallup put it on the questionnaires, it must have been part of an extensive
debate, in the media, and of debates at the Danish Parliament, Folketinget. It proves
that sanctions and the debate on sanctions against apartheid in South Africa,
Namibia and Rhodesia for that matter, was a part of the political debate in
Denmark. It was not a debate limited to the left wing in Denmark, as
Christensen tends to claim. Also, organisations like the Danish Youth Council,
other youth organisations, women's organisations, and so on were active in the
debate, and in the streets, for sanctions.
In newer Danish history, the speech of
Hækkerup is often portrayed as proof of Denmark’s position in the forefront of
the criticism of apartheid and in the support of the liberation movements. Therefore,
the question arise if Per Hækkerup was aware, that he was killing the
possibilities for the UN Annual Assembly to make decisions on South Africa,
when he, supported by the other Nordic countries, said that actions against
apartheid were a matter of the UN Security Council?
Oliver Tambo, at the time the President of
ANC, made it clear in a number of speeches that the ANC wanted all countries to
impose sanctions without a decision made in the UN Security Council first:
”Given the necessary political will, a Member
State, first, can and should impose sanctions on South Africa without relying
on a Security Council resolution. Secondly, every government decision to
isolate South Africa completely has its own impact in encouraging similar
action by other governments. Thirdly, for those determined to see the
liberation of Namibia and South Africa, the sacrifices they have to make in the
event of the imposition of sanctions on the Pretoria racist regime must be seen
as their part in the struggle for peace, stability and progress.”
While the Nordic countries were in front
with the verbal criticism of apartheid, they did not want to do anything
concrete on the national level unless the UN Security Council supported it. It
would have been very difficult for other western countries to take this issue
up, because most of the NATO countries actually looked at the apartheid regime
as an ally against communism. Many who were against apartheid South Africa were
labelled communists. It was a constant worry in the Danish Trade unions, as
well as in the Social Democratic Party that the ANC was in alliance with the
SACP, the South African Communist Party, and that the SACP could have influence
on the ANC and the trade union movement in South Africa.
That very narrow-minded security political
thinking, enabled Denmark, also under the Social Democratic governments in the
1970s and the beginning of the 80s, to increase the trade with South Africa
during the years of strong but rather empty criticism of apartheid, and turn
the deaf ear to the demands from the liberation movements in South Africa, on
implementing economic sanctions.
Several leaders in the Social Democratic
Party and in the trade union movement considered the different Danish
anti-apartheid solidarity movements occurring during these years to be cover
organisations for the Communist Party in Denmark. This perception of
anti-communism was hence not only a common policy on the right wing of Danish
politics, but also a common perception among many Social Democrats. In many
ways, it could be claimed that Steen Christensen does the same in his article,
by focusing on the role of the left wing and the communists and not on the
interaction between the solidarity movement and the parliamentarian system in
Denmark. The Social Democratic Party did not as a governing party wish to
introduce sanctions against South Africa. Instead, its strategy was to allow
for some Danish NGOs to receive governmental funds for the support of the
victims of apartheid. The effects of this support should not be underestimated
of course. All in all, it amounted to several 100 millions DKK.
The cold shoulder that the ANC got after
the banning in the beginning of the 1960s by the official political scene in
western European countries meant that they needed to get military support from
the socialist world.
Was our Danish alternative to effective isolation
mostly an allocation of money to students and refugees in exile? Did this in reality
work as a buying up of future leaders instead of supporting the main political
demand which was sanctions? Could these donations channelled through NGOs really
constitute a reasonable Danish contribution to the struggle against apartheid?
A possible side effect was that some large
Danish NGOs with close cooperation with the Foreign Ministry receiving these
funds remained relatively quiet on the question of sanctions. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that the dedicated Anti-Apartheid Movement in Denmark
(LSA/SAK) did not get governmental support until 1994.
When the political and financial support
(which as mentioned was channelled via the Danish NGOs) grew heavily in the
1980s, Danish trade with South Africa simultaneously grew rapidly. In 1984, the
purchase of South African coal topped and Denmark was the one country in the
world buying the most coal in South Africa. Danish ships owned by Maersk were
the main deliverers of oil to South Africa in 1983/84/85. A Danish shipping
company, Tricon, made the most well known case of breaking the UN embargo
against arms’ sales to South Africa supplying arms to SADF, South African
Defence Force. In the 1980s, there were guests from four different Danish
parliament parties in South Africa meting with the white regime. At the same
time pension funds under the control of the Danish labour movement invested in
companies which had interests in South Africa or in South African companies.
The question of economic sanctions was an
issue which divided the Social Democratic Party and the labour movement in
Denmark. When one look into the media debate of that time, it seems clear that
there are a number of groups with clearly different perceptions in the Social
Democratic Party and the labour movement, and one should think that Steen
Christensen with his inside knowledge would be aware of these splits. We know
that SiD, the General Workers Union was in many ways supporting sanctions, but
the Danish Metal Workers’ Union, on the other hand, was very critical to
economic sanctions. From my meetings with Social Democratic members of
parliament, I know that also in their parliamentary group there were leading members,
which were very critical of the use of sanctions against South Africa.
The high-level meetings between Social
Democratic Parties from Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Norway on South Africa is not
mentioned in Steen Christensen's article, even if they must have played a
crucial role, since at these meetings politics were coordinated on behalf of
the Socialist International. South African Labour movement leaders have told me
that these meetings were very important for the building of the labour movement
in SA, but parts of this history is still kept in the dark.
Despite the half-hearted support, the ANC
wanted to get good relations with the Nordic countries. It is quite clear for
me that the ANC needed recognition, and close connections to the Nordic
countries actually helped here. ANC was on the CIA list of terrorist movements
for many years. It also made good sense at least in the 1980s during the
Thatcher and Reagan time, having good contacts within some NATO countries. As a
national liberation movement ANC's aim was, to get as much political influence
and recognition as possible. And the recognition and contacts to the trade
union movements, the solidarity organisations, and the political parties were
useful. The ANC's 75 years anniversary meeting in Copenhagen in 1987 very
clearly showed that the ANC eventually had succeeded. The main speaker was a
leading liberal politician, at that time minister of education (and from 2004 again
minister of integration) Bertel Haarder, who spoke on behalf of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann Jensen, also a liberal.
ANC representatives attempted to get
diplomatic recognition, but generally they did not succeed in Western Europe.
Denmark never broke the diplomatic relations with South Africa; it only moved
the embassy in 1985 from Pretoria to Zimbabwe.
In his article in this book, Steen
Christensen writes quite a lot about the solidarity with Chile and Vietnam, the
Danish Communist Party’s (DKP) role, and the left wing’s internal splits in
these movements. However, there is not much to find about that kind of
divisions in the South Africa solidarity in Denmark. The solidarity with South
Africa apparently did not have the exact same kind of attraction on the left
wing as the two other solidarity movements had. In my opinion, this was because
of our strong relationship with the ANC. Apart from the Danish Communist Party
and the Socialist Peoples Party, the rest of the left wing in Denmark didn't
have much faith in the ANC, and preferred other contacts in South Africa, for
example New Unity Movement and the PAC. On the other hand, it is quite clear
that the Danish Communist Party and the Socialist Peoples Party understood the
ANC as what it was at that time: a national liberation movement, not more, not
less.
The fact that the Social Democratic Party
and most of the LO trade unions, left the Anti-Apartheid Movement (LSAS/SAK) in
1979 (while the Social Democrats were in government) had several reasons. The
main reason was disagreements on sanctions. The reason was not, that the left
wing dominated the work. The anti-apartheid movement in Denmark was a very
broad movement, with rather few active members from left wing political
parties. Neither could it be because the anti-apartheid movement made demands
that were not already made by the ANC.
To me it seems that the reasons for the
split must be found firstly in the social democrat’s wish for having their own
contacts with the ANC and the South African trade union movement, secondly in
the resistance to the demands made by the anti-apartheid movement of state
sanctions, and finally because of the uncertainty of the intentions of the ANC.
The military campaign by the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the support from the
Soviet were not easily recognised by the Social Democratic Party.
Finally, I will give some very brief
suggestions to why the popular campaign in Denmark for economic sanctions got
such a broad backup.
The explanation as to why the Danish
anti-apartheid movement, with relatively little resources, could create
attention, public support and pressure on Danish politicians is to be found in
a number of key conditions:
· Good connections to the ANC.
· The time was on our side, with the formation of
the UDF (United Democratic Front) and COSATU in South Africa, which increased
political activity in South Africa itself and thereby from 1984 and onwards
increased the media coverage and discussions about the development in South
Africa.
· Close cooperation with Danish journalists
working with South Africa.
· Political actions that created attention in the
media and thereby made questions to the politicians in order to do something.
· Clear strategies for the coordination between
activism and political lobby work.
· Clear strategies with regards to messages, aims
and methods.
In a period of more than forty years the
grassroots in Denmark succeeded in putting the apartheid regime of South Africa
on the agenda and in pointing at, how the Danish government could contribute in
isolating the regime in Pretoria.
The starting point in the 1960s was a
consumers' boycott of South African fruit and other products. This campaign got
broad political support, also from the Social Democratic Youth Organisation and
from some trade unions. But as these demands by the end of the 70s developed
into demands for state sanctions against the apartheid regime, the political
support disappeared from centre to the right of Danish official politics. The
social democratic government did not want to take the initiative in order to
write laws on economic sanctions. Only after a strong public campaign, it was
decided that the buying of South African coal was banned. This was in 1986 and
later the same year the trade sanctions were introduced, prohibiting South
African products in Denmark as well as sale of Danish products and services to
South Africa.
The strong focus from our side in the
anti-apartheid movement on crimes committed by apartheid meant that no Danes or
especially Danish politicians could claim not to know. This is why, I have
found it difficult to see Danish politicians and business leaders shaking hand
with Mandela and, tell about the good figure Denmark did in the struggle
against apartheid. We who experienced the complete hypocrisy from most
politicians and business leaders know that it was the public pressure on the
politicians and business leaders that forced them to act.
The history is now being written in the
same way as when somebody tries to portrait FW de Klerk as the man who removed
apartheid, because he was a nice person who wanted democracy. So according to
the same kind of revisionism, it was the Danish ministers and civil servants
who were in the forefront in the struggle against apartheid. Ask yourself: was
it the massive public protest in our part of the world, which got ministers and
civil servants to change opinions? Who worked against the implementation of
economic sanctions? Sanctions that the liberation movements wanted so strongly.
Pro or contra apartheid was, as I have
stated, in Denmark to a large degree a domestic national issue. The direct reason
that it became practically possible to implement economic sanctions in 1986 was
not us, not the left-wing, not the trade-unions movements, not the social
democrats, but the small centre-right party, the Social Liberals (Det Radikale
Venstre), who changed opinion on the subject after a long internal debate in
the party about the use of economic sanctions as a part of foreign politics. It
was when they changed their position that a majority supporting economic
sanctions was made possible in Danish parliament. The majority had been there
before 1985 (Social democrats and the left wing) and several times in the 30
years the debate on economic sanctions lasted. However, the Social Democratic
Party together with the liberal-conservative parties voted down proposal
followed by proposal from the left wing in the parliament.
I hope that three decades of lobby work on
the Social Liberals and the Social Democratic Party in Denmark contributed to
this change. I hope the three decades of solidarity work by thousands of Danes
will get space in the history books in the future. I doubt it, but I hope.